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Abstract
Should workers of a firm be organizationally integrated to realize benefits
from benchmarking? Or should they be separated to preclude horizontal social
comparisons? This paper highlights a trade-off that arises if social comparisons
in firms are endogenous. We analyze a principal multi-agent model in which
the principal trades off the reduction of agents’ risk exposures by use of relative
performance evaluation and the thereby induced social comparisons for which
agents must be compensated. Contrary to standard theoretical predictions, rel-
ative performance evaluation is optimal only if the performance measures are
sufficiently correlated relative to the agents’ regard for others.
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1 Introduction
It has long been noticed that social comparisons among workers in firms affect the op-
timal design of incentive contracts. Milgrom and Roberts (1992), for example, wrote:
“When people do compare their pay, properly applied and understood incentive pay
inevitably leads to invidious comparisons. Under a well designed scheme, equally tal-
ented people who are motivated to work equally hard will be paid differently as a result
of chance variations that affect their measured performance. [...] This is a constraint on
the use of any sort of incentive pay.” (p. 419) In recent years, a number of papers applied
models of social preferences such as inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton
and Ockenfels 2000) to moral hazard situations to formally analyze how exactly social
comparisons among workers affect the optimal design of incentive contracts (e.g., Itoh
2004, Demougin, Fluet, and Helm 2006, Dur and Glazer 2008, Rey Biel 2008, Bartling
and von Siemens 2010, Englmaier and Wambach 2010, Neilson and Stowe 2010). The
implications of the reverse channel of influence, that is, the assumption that the de-
sign of incentive contracts can affect social comparisons among workers, have not been
addressed in the literature so far.1
In this paper, we derive the implications of the assumption that the use of rela-
tive performance evaluation (“organizational integration”) lowers the “social distance”
between the agents. We assume that compared to the case of independent contracts
(“organizational separation”), social comparisons among the agents are then more pro-
nounced. In terms of the model of inequity aversion, if the social distance between two
agents is short, we assume that the two agents are in each other’s reference group. So-
cial comparisons among agents exist if an agent’s utility is not only determined by his
own payoff but also by the payoffs of the agents’ in his reference group. In the model of
1In related papers, Englmaier and Leider (2008) and Dur (2009) model the idea that the contract
offered by the principal may signal his kindness and hence affect the way a reciprocal agent compares
his income to that of the principal. While social comparisons among multiple agents are the focus of
our paper, a reciprocal relation between the principal and an agent is the focus of their papers. Also
related, Dur and Sol (2010) study how incentive contracts affect agents’ decisions to invest in social
relationships. In the context of the theory of the firm, Nickerson and Zenger (2008) and Bartling and
von Siemens (2010) discuss the idea that social comparisons are more pronounced among employees
within firms than among individuals who interact in markets.
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inequity aversion, e.g., an agent suffers a utility loss if an agent in his reference group
receives a payoff that is different from the own payoff.
How can different forms of incentive contracts affect social comparisons? If contracts
are independent, the agents do not necessarily know each other’s wage. If however the
principal makes use of relative performance evaluation (RPE), the agents inevitably
learn each other’s wage. Wage comparisons among the agents might thus be more
pronounced in the latter case. Even the mere fact that one’s own wage is dependent
on another agent’s performance (a clear link between the agents is established) might
lower the social distance between the agents.
The determination of an agent’s reference group is ultimately an empirical question.
Support for our assumption comes, for example, from experimental studies investigat-
ing the impact of social distance on dictator game giving (social comparisons, e.g.
modeled as inequity aversion, can be a reason for giving in dictator games). For ex-
ample, in a study of friendship networks, Goeree et al. (2010) show that there is an
“inverse distance law of giving” and that social distance—in their case measured by the
length of the shortest path connecting two subjects in their network of friends—is the
primary explanation for giving behavior. Similarly results were obtained by Hoffman et
al. (1996), Bohnet and Frey (1999), and Charness and Gneezy (2008) who manipulate
social distance by varying the anonymity of subjects’ decisions, visual one or two-way
identification, or communication. In our model, social distance is assumed to vary if an
agent’s wage is either dependent or independent of the another agent’s performance.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model to formally analyze the
trade-off that arises if benchmarking induces social comparisons. On the one hand,
in our model the principal can make use of RPE to reduce the agents’ risk exposure.
On the other hand, there is a “curse of RPE” as it lowers social distance and thus
necessitates compensation for the induced social comparisons.2 Standard incentive
theory predicts that principals always use RPE to reduce the agents’ risk exposure
(e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981, Holmstro¨m 1982). In contrast, our model predicts that
2A similar trade-off arises if complementarities in production exist that can only be realized if the
agents are “integrated,” e.g., if work in organized in teams.
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independent contracts are optimal if the size of the correlation coefficient is small rela-
tive to the degree of the agents’ inequity aversion. Only if the correlation is sufficiently
large, RPE and thus organizational integration becomes the optimal solution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model
that incorporates social preferences into an otherwise standard moral hazard framework
with multiple agents. Section 3 derives the optimal incentive contract for inequity
averse agents. Section 4 analyzes the trade-off between integration and separation that
arises with endogenous social comparisons. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We incorporate the agents’ social preferences into the otherwise standard Holmstro¨m
and Milgrom (1990) principal-multi agent model. Consider a principal and two identical
agents. The agents choose effort levels ai, i ∈ {1, 2}, at personal cost a2i /2, measured in
monetary units. Contracts can only condition on performance indicators qi = ai + εi,
which is the principal’s gross profit from agent i’s activity. Production is technologically
independent but the performance indicators can be correlated. The error terms ε1
and ε2 are drawn from a symmetric multivariate normal distribution with mean zero,
variance σ2ε > 0, and covariance σεε. The correlation coefficient is ρ = σεε/σ
2
ε .
The principal is risk neutral and maximizes his expected profit. The agents exhibit
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), formally given by the negative exponential
utility function
−exp{−η(wi − a2i /2− Li)} (1)
where η > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, wi agent i’s wage, and Li agent i’s
expected loss from inequality, measured in monetary units, which is explained below.
The principal can remunerate each agent as a function of both agents’ performance
indicators. We restrict attention to linear contracts. Agent i’s wage is then given by
wi = r + vqi + uqj (2)
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with i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, where r denotes a fixed payment, v the compensation coefficient
of an agent’s own performance indicator, and u the coefficient of the respective other
agent’s indicator. We consider symmetric contracts only, i.e., r, v, and u are identical
for both agents. We speak of RPE (“organizational integration”) if u 6= 0 and an
independent contract (“organizational separation”) if u = 0.
The key assumption in this paper is that the agents’ reference groups are affected
by the principal’s compensation policy. We assume that agents do not compare their
wages to each other if the compensation schemes are independent (social distance is
large), but that the principal induces social comparisons if he makes use of RPE (social
distance is short). We model social comparisons as symmetric inequity aversion (Fehr
and Schmidt 1999). An inequity averse agent incurs a utility loss if his wage differs
from the wages of other agents in his reference group, and symmetry implies that only
the size but not the sign of the wage difference matters.3 In particular, we assume that
the agents care—given RPE places them into each other’s reference group—about the
expected loss from inequality that results from accepting the contract. Agent i’s loss
from expected inequality takes the form
Li = α(v − u)
( ∫ ∞
ai−aj
(z − ai + aj)f(z)dz +
∫ ai−aj
−∞
(ai − aj − z)f(z)dz
)
(3)
where z ≡ εj − εi and f(z) is the p.d.f. of z, which is z ∼ N(0, σ2z) with σ2z =
2(1 − ρ)σ2ε . The agents’ sensitivity to inequality is denoted by α ≥ 0. The expected
loss from inequality is taken ex-ante and independently from the expectation over wage
levels. It thus enters the agents’ utility function (1) as a fixed amount, equivalent to a
wealth effect. The formulation implies that the agents are risk neutral with respect to
inequality but risk averse with respect to wages.4
The principal maximizes expected gross profits minus expected wage payments
3In the notation of the Fehr-Schmidt model, we thus assume α = β. The restriction to symmetric
inequity aversion is made for simplicity. See Bartling (2011) for an analysis of the same model
frame that allows for more general social preferences and also considers effort costs in the agents’
comparisons. The derivation of the optimal contracts in this paper follows Bartling (2011).
4One reason for assuming risk aversion is consumption smoothing, which applies to wages but not
to social comparisons. Moreover, we are not aware of any evidence suggesting either risk aversion or
risk neutrality with regard to social comparisons. Risk neutrality is thus a possible modeling choice.
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by choice of r, v, and u. His certainty equivalent (CE) from contracting with an
agent is given by CEP = ai − (r + vai + uaj). The principal must ensure the agents’
participation and take into account that, given the contract, the agents maximize their
utility functions by choice of effort. Maximization of an agent’s utility function is
equivalent to maximization of his CE, which can be stated as
CEi = r + vai + uaj − a2i /2− η(v2 + u2 + 2vuρ)σ2ε/2− Li(ai, aj, v, u) (4)
An agent’s CE consists of the expected wage, effort cost, risk exposure, and—in case
agents compare their pay—the expected loss from inequality. Any efficient contract
maximizes the joint surplus, so the principal’s program is given by
max
v,u
a∗i − a∗
2
i /2− η(v2 + u2 + 2vuρ)σ2ε/2− Li(a∗i , a∗j , v, u) (5)
subject to the incentive and participation constraints
a∗i ∈ arg maxaiCEi(ai, a∗j , v, u) (6)
CEi(a
∗
i , a
∗
j , v, u) ≥ 0 (7)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. If the agents’ optimal effort choices are interdependent via the
comparison terms, the incentive constraint (6) requires that effort choices form a Nash
equilibrium given v and u. We restrict attention to the derivation of a symmetric equi-
librium, i.e., a∗i = a
∗
j . It is important to notice that at ai = aj , an agent cannot affect
expected inequality neither by marginally working harder nor by marginally slacking
off, i.e., ∂Li/∂ai |ai=aj= 0. Hence, as in the standard case with purely self-interested
agents, the incentive constraint (6) can be written as v = ai. The participation con-
straint (7) requires the fixed payment r to be set such that the agents receive their
outside CEs, which are normalized to zero. In contrast to the incentive constraint, the
participation constraint is affected by symmetric inequity aversion because the agents
must be compensated not only for their effort costs and risk exposure but also for
their expected loss from inequality in equilibrium. With symmetric effort choices, the
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equilibrium loss from inequality depends on the relative size of the error terms only (as
in a symmetric tournament), and expression (3) can be written as
Li(v, u | a∗i = a∗j ) = 2α(v − u)
√
1− ρ
pi
σε (8)
The derivation of expression (8) is in Appendix A1. The equilibrium expected loss from
inequality increases in α, the agents’ sensitivity to inequitable wages, it increases in the
measurement error σε because with higher variance more probability mass is on larger
wage differences, and it decreases in the correlation coefficient ρ because with positive
correlation the agents’ wages are more aligned. Finally, the smaller the difference v−u
of the compensation coefficients, the smaller the expected loss; it is zero under a perfect
team contract (u = v) where the agents always receive the same wages.
3 Optimal Contracts
In this section, we derive the optimal contractual solution for general values of the
agents degree α ≥ 0 of inequity aversion and of the correlation coefficient ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
First, the principal determines the optimal u, given v. Maximization of the principal’s
objective function (5) with respect to u, the coefficient of the respective other agent’s
performance measure, yields
u∗ = min
[
−vρ+ 2α
ησε
√
1− ρ
pi
, v
]
(9)
The derivation of u∗ can be found in Appendix A.2. Solution (9) shows that there is a
risk-inequality trade-off in determining u∗. If agents do not place the respective other
agent in their reference group, i.e., if α = 0, then u∗ = −vρ. The solution reflects that
if the error terms are correlated, some (in case of perfect correlation all) of the risk
imposed on agent i can be filtered out by using the information in agent j’s performance
measure. However, the larger the agents’ degree α of inequity aversion relative to the
degree η of risk aversion, the larger the deviation from the risk minimizing solution.
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Only if ρ ∈ {−1, 1}, i.e., if the performance measures are perfectly correlated, there
is no deviation from the risk minimizing contract. With perfect positive correlation,
the agents always produce the same output and thus always receive the same wage.
With perfect negative correlation, a perfect team contract is optimal with purely self-
interested agents already, and it also ensures that no inequality arises.
In the second step of the solution of the principal’s program, the optimal incentive
intensity v is derived. Given u∗, this yields
v∗ = max

 1− 2ασε
√
1−ρ
pi
(1 + ρ)
1 + ησ2ε(1− ρ2)
,
1
1 + 2ησ2ε(1 + ρ)

 (10)
The left term applies in case u∗ < v∗, the right term in case u∗ = v∗. The derivation
of v∗ can be found in Appendix A.3. Notice that with α = 0, v∗ is given by the left
term in (10), and this corresponds the solution in Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1990). It
shows that the larger the size of the correlation coefficient ρ, the larger the optimal
incentive coefficient because more risk can be filtered out. If agents are inequity averse
and place the respective other agent in their reference groups, i.e. α > 0, then the
optimal incentive intensity is reduced.5 The reason is the risk-inequality trade-off in
the determination of u∗ that results—for each incentive intensity v—in a (weakly)
higher risk exposure and also to a (weakly) positive exposure to inequality, for which
the agents must be compensated. The optimal incentive intensity v∗ is thus lower.
If the principal separates the agents, he cannot use the information that is contained
in the respective other agent’s performance measure to reduce the risk exposure. But
this also precludes social comparisons. In this case, the optimal coefficient of the
respective other agent’s performance measure is given by
u∗ = 0 (11)
5Strictly speaking, so far we argued that the reference group and not the preference parameter α
is affected by the principal’s contract choice. However, in our model the effect is identical, and it is
more convenient to vary α. Arguing that the contractual environment affects the degree of inequity
aversion towards the other agent (in such a model, different values of α apply to different people in
one’s reference group) would allow for the less extreme assumption that independent contracts reduce
but not necessarily fully preclude social comparisons.
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and the optimal incentive intensity by
v∗ =
1
1 + ησ2ε
(12)
which corresponds to solutions (9) and (10) with α = 0 and ρ = 0.
4 Optimal Organizational Solution
In this section, we derive the optimal organizational solution. The principal can either
separate the agents, that is, offer them independent contracts (u∗ = 0), or integrate
them, that is, make use of RPE (u∗ 6= 0). Linking the agents’ wages to each other’s
performance measure reduces their risk exposure if ρ ∈ (−1, 1) but it also induces social
comparisons, i.e., α > 0. The agents then have to be compensated for the associated
loss from inequality.
In the previous section, we have derived the general optimal incentive contracts for
ρ ∈ [−1, 1] and α ≥ 0. If the principal separates the agents organizationally, he sets
u∗ = 0. The optimal incentive intensity v∗ is then given by the left entry in (10) with
ρ = 0 and α = 0. By inserting the optimal contract u∗ = 0 and v∗ = 1/(1 + η σ2ε)
into the principal’s objective function we find that the principal’s profit (i.e., the social
surplus) from contracting separately with both agents independently is given by
Πsep =
1
1 + η σ2ε
(13)
If the principal integrates the agents organizationally, he sets u∗ 6= 0. Since bench-
marking induces social comparisons, we now have α > 0, such that the optimal values
for u and v are given by (9) and (10) with ρ ∈ [−1, 1] and α > 0. The principal’s profit
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in case of integration is then given by
Πint =


(
1− 2ασε
√
1−ρ
pi
(1 + ρ)
)2
1 + ησ2ε(1− ρ2)
+
4α2
η
1− ρ
pi
if u∗ < v∗
1
1 + 2η σ2ε (1 + ρ)
if u∗ = v∗
(14)
The principal’s profit would be largest, if he could make use of RPE without in-
ducing social comparisons. The resulting profit Π = 1/(1 + ησ2ε(1− ρ2)) would weakly
dominate the above solutions. In the following, we derive the optimal feasible organiza-
tional choice—given our assumption that benchmarking incudes social comparisons—
by comparing the respective principal’s profits as given in (13) and (14).
The optimal incentive intensity as given in (10) reveals that there exists a threshold
level
α˜ =
ησε(1 + ρ)
2
√
1−ρ
pi
(1 + 2ησ2ε(1 + ρ))
(15)
such that if α < α˜, then u∗ < v∗ and if α ≥ α˜, then u∗ = v∗. The dashed line in
Figure 1 shows α˜ as a function of ρ, where we have set η = 1 and σ = 2. With purely
self-interested agents, the perfect team contract u∗ = v∗ is optimal with with per-
fect negative correlation only. With inequity averse agents, the perfect team contract,
which eliminates all inequality, can be optimal even with less than perfect negative
correlation. The dashed line is monotonically increasing because the larger the corre-
lation coefficient, the lower the optimal u from a point of view of risk reduction. The
degree α of inequity aversion then has to be accordingly higher to render the perfect
team contract nevertheless optimal.
In Figure 1, the area above the dashed line represents the case where u∗ = v∗ is
optimal under integration. To determine the optimal organizational choice we have to
compare the respective principal’s profits. It is straightforward to check that separation
is preferred if ρ > −1/2, which is illustrated by the vertical solid line. The intuition
for the result is as follows. The agents’s degree α of inequity aversion is so high that a
perfect team contract is optimal under integration (α ≥ α˜). If there is perfect negative
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Figure 1: Optimal Organizational Choice in the α-ρ-Space.
correlation, this contract is also optimal from a point of view of risk reduction. If
the correlation coefficient is increasing (imperfect negative correlation or even positive
correlation), then the inequity eliminating perfect team contract runs counter the risk
reducing solution. Therefore, a some point it becomes optimal not to use RPE any
longer but to separate the agents. Since both, the optimal contract under separation
and under integration are independent of α, the value of ρ that determines the optimal
organizational choice is also independent of α.
The area below the dashed line represents the case where u∗ < v∗ is optimal under
integration. To determine the optimal organizational choice we again have to compare
the respective principal’s profits. It turns out that the threshold ˜˜α such that separation
is optimal for α ≥ ˜˜α is given by
˜˜α =
ησε(1 + ρ)− ησε
√
(1 + ρ)2 − ρ2
(1+ησ2ε )
(1 + 2ησ2ε(1 + ρ))
2
√
1−ρ
pi
(1 + 2ησ2ε(1 + ρ))
(16)
The solid u-shaped line in Figure 1 shows ˜˜α as a function of ρ, again with η = 1 and
σ = 2. We summarize these findings in the following proposition.
Proposition Assume RPE induces social comparisons. Then there exists an interval
of the correlation coefficient [ ρ , ρ ] with −1/2 ≤ ρ < 0 < ρ < 1 such that for ρ ∈ [ ρ , ρ ]
independent contracts are optimal while for ρ /∈ [ ρ , ρ ] RPE is optimal.
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Consider first the case of perfect correlation, i.e., ρ ∈ {−1, 1}. RPE is then optimal
because it achieves the first best (no risk and no inequality exposure) while indepen-
dent contracts do not. Without correlation, i.e., ρ = 0, RPE is of no value but induces
social comparisons. In this case, independent contracts are optimal. Hence, if there
is little correlation, independent contracts are optimal while RPE becomes optimal at
some point as | ρ |→ 1. Furthermore, Figure 1 illustrates that there is an interesting
asymmetry. With purely self-interested agents, the size only but not the sign of the
correlation coefficient is important. To reduce the agents’ risk exposure it does not
matter whether a given degree of correlation is positive of negative. With inequity
averse agents, however, the sign of the correlation matters. With negative correlation,
both risk reduction and reduction of expected inequality require a positive u. In con-
trast, with positive correlation, risk reduction requires a negative u while the reduction
of expected inequality always requires a positive u. The trade-off in the determination
of the optimal u is thus more severe in case of positive correlation. Therefore, for given
values of α, integration is optimal for lower absolute values of the correlation coefficient
if there is negative correlation. If ρ < −1/2, integration is always optimal, irrespec-
tive of α. With positive correlation, however, for large values of α, the correlation
coefficient ρ has to approach 1 to render integration optimal.
5 Conclusion
The results of this paper contribute to a better understanding of the trade-offs that a
manager faces when deciding on the optimal internal organization of a firm. We analyze
a principal multi-agent model to highlight a trade-off that arises if social comparisons
in firms are endogenous. In particular, we assume that social comparisons are induced
if the agents are organizationally integrated in the sense that the principal makes use
of RPE because this lowers the social distance between them. If, however, the agents
are organizationally separated in the sense that they receive independent contracts, we
assume that they do not compare their pay to each other. Under these assumptions,
the principal faces a trade-off between the reduction of the agents’ risk exposure by use
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of RPE and the thereby induced social comparisons that cause utility losses for which
the agents must be compensated. Contrary to the standard theoretical prediction that
RPE is always optimal, our model predicts that RPE is optimal only if the performance
measures are sufficiently correlated relative the the agents’ regard for others.
Appendix
A.1 Derivation the Expected Loss from Inequality in Equation (8)
Equation (8) is derived by integration of the expression in (3), given ai = aj.
Li = α(v − u)
(∫
∞
0
zf(z)dz +
∫ 0
−∞
−zf(z)dz
)
= 2α(v − u)
∫
∞
0
zf(z)dz = 2α(v − u) 1√
2piσz
∫
∞
0
z e
−
z2
2σ2z dz
= lim
y→∞
2α(v − u) 1√
2piσz
[
−σ2z e
−
z2
2σ2z
]y
0
= 2α(v − u) 1√
2pi
σz = 2α(v − u)
√
1− ρ
pi
σε (A1)
A.2 Derivation of u∗ in Equation (9)
The principal maximizes his objective function (5) with respect to u, where Li(ai, aj, v, u)
is given by (8). The first-order condition is then given by
(1− a∗i )
∂a∗i
∂u
− 0.5η(2u+ 2vρ)σ2ε + 2α
√
1− ρ
pi
σε = 0. (A2)
The incentive constraint is given by a∗i = v, hence ∂a
∗
i /∂u = 0. Rearranging then
yields the left entry in (9).
12
A.3 Derivation of v∗ in Equation (10)
Substituting u∗ = −vρ+ (2α/ησε)
√
(1− ρ)/pi into the objective function (5) yields
a∗i − a∗i /2− 0.5η
(
v2 +
(
−vρ+ 2α
ησε
√
1− ρ
pi
)2
+
2v
(
−vρ+ 2α
ησε
√
1− ρ
pi
)
ρ
)
σ2ε − α(1 + β)
(
v + vρ− 2α
ησε
√
1− ρ
pi
)√
1− ρ
pi
σε
= a∗i − a∗i /2− 0.5ησ2ε(1− ρ2)v2 +
2α
η
1− ρ
pi
− 2ασε
√
1− ρ
pi
(1 + ρ)v. (A3)
Maximization with respect to v yields the first-order condition
(1− a∗i )
∂a∗i
∂v
− ησ2ε(1− ρ2)v − 2ασε
√
1− ρ
pi
(1 + ρ) = 0. (A4)
Substituting the incentive constraint a∗i = v and using ∂a
∗
i /∂v = 1, we get
1− v − ησ2ε(1− ρ2)v − 2ασε
√
1− ρ
pi
(1 + ρ) = 0
⇔ v∗ = (1− 2ασε
√
1− ρ
pi
(1 + ρ)
)
/
(
1 + ησ2ε(1− ρ2)
)
. (A5)
In case u∗ = v, the objective function (5) simplifies to
a∗i − a∗i /2− 0.5η
(
v2 + v2 + 2v2ρ
)
σ2ε . (A6)
Maximization with respect to v then yields the first-order condition
(1− a∗i )
∂a∗i
∂v
− 2ησ2ε(1 + ρ)v = 0 ⇔ v∗ = 1/
(
1 + 2ησ2ε(1 + ρ)). (A7)
The optimal v is thus given by equation (10).
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